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IS BRADLEY A RETRIBUTIVIST?
Thom Brooks1,2
Abstract: Perhaps the least controversial area of F.H. Bradley’s writings relates to
his views on punishment. Commentators universally recognize Bradley’s theory of
punishment as a retributivist theory of punishment. This article challenges the received
wisdom. I argue that Bradley does not endorse retributivism as commonly understood.
Instead, he defends the view that punishment is non-retributivist and serves the end of
societal maintenance. Moreover, Bradley defends this view consistently from Ethical
Studies to later work on punishment. Instead of holding a theory of punishment largely
unique amongst British Idealists of his time, Bradley’s views on punishment are far
more consistent than previously thought.
I
Perhaps the least controversial area of F.H. Bradley’s writings relates to his
views on punishment. Commentators universally recognize Bradley’s theory
of punishment as a retributivist theory of punishment.3 Over his career,
Bradley’s most significant discussions of punishment appear in two publica-
tions: Ethical Studies published in 1876 and ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXXII. No. 1. Spring 2011
1 Department of Politics, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU.
Email: t.brooks@newcastle.ac.uk
2 This article was presented at the Political Studies Association conference held in
Bath, 11–13 April 2007. I am most grateful to David Boucher, James Connolly, Duncan
Kelly, Bill Mander, Peter Nicholson, Bob Stern, Colin Tyler, Albert Weale and two
anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous drafts.
3 For example, see M. Davis, ‘Harm and Retribution’, Philosophy and Public Affairs,
15 (1986), p. 236; J.P. Day, ‘Retributive Punishment’, Mind, 87 (1978), p. 499; A.C.
Ewing, ‘Punishment as a Moral Agency: An Attempt to Reconcile the Retributive and
Utilitarian View’, Mind, 36 (1927), pp. 293–4; D.B. Hershenov, ‘Restitution and
Revenge’, Journal of Philosophy, 96 (1999), pp. 80–1; D.B. Hershenov, ‘Punishing
Failed Attempts Less Severely Than Successes’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 34 (2000),
p. 482; A.S. Kaufman, ‘Anthony Quinton on Punishment’, Analysis, 20 (1959), pp. 10–
13; J.D. Mabbott, ‘Punishment’, Mind, 48 (1939), pp. 153–4, 157; J.D. Mabbott, ‘Free-
will and Punishment’, in Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, 3rd
series, ed. H.D. Lewis (London, 1956), p. 289; I. Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment
(Atlantic Highland, 1989), p. 55; A.M. Quinton, ‘On Punishment’, Analysis, 14 (1953),
p. 137; and L. Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 75, 128–9.
Some commentators have held more ambiguous positions on Bradley’s retributivism,
such as P. Johnson, ‘Bradley and the Nature of Punishment’, in The Philosophy of F.H.
Bradley, ed. A. Manser and G. Stock (Oxford, 1984), pp. 99–116; J.S. Mackenzie, A
Manual of Ethics (London, 4th edn., 1901), p. 405 n. 1 (‘This is the view of punishment
which appears to accord best with the origin of punishment among early peoples . . .’
Bradley offers us ‘an emphatic statement of this view’); J. Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of
Rules’, in Collected Papers, ed. S. Freeman (Cambridge, 1999), p. 24 n. 8; and D. Ross,
The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), p. 57.
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published in an 1894 issue of the International Journal of Ethics.4 The vast
majority of commentators on Bradley’s views on punishment almost exclu-
sively consider Bradley’s Ethical Studies rather than his later article.5
This article challenges the received wisdom. I argue that Bradley does not
endorse retributivism as commonly understood. Instead, he defends the view
that punishment is non-retributivist and serves the end of societal mainte-
nance. Bradley defends this view in both his Ethical Studies and the later article
on punishment, demonstrating the consistency of his position. Thus, his views
are not uniquely retributivist amongst British Idealists. Instead, Bradley’s
theory of punishment is similar in important respects to competing British
Idealist theories of punishment — such as the theories of T.H. Green, Bernard
Bosanquet and James Seth — in finding societal maintenance to be the high-
est aim of legal punishment.
My argument unfolds in the following way. First, I will discuss why com-
mentators have taken Bradley’s theory of punishment presented in Ethical
Studies to be a retributivist theory. Second, I will demonstrate why these com-
mentators have been mistaken about Bradley’s position in Ethical Studies. I
will then conclude by arguing that Bradley’s views remained the same in his
later work in the International Journal of Ethics.
II
The view that Bradley was a retributivist was perhaps first raised by Hastings
Rashdall.6 Rashdall offers two substantive points. First, he argues that Bradley
offers a retributivist theory of punishment in Ethical Studies where we mete
out ‘punishment for punishment’s sake’ to deserving criminals.7 Second,
Rashdall argues that Bradley changes his views on punishment after the publi-
cation of Ethical Studies: ‘Mr. Bradley formerly maintained that it was
immoral to punish except for retribution: now he defends “social Surgery” . . .
84 T. BROOKS
4 See F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 2nd edn., 1927 [1876]); and
F.H. Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, International Journal of Ethics, 4
(1894), pp. 269–84.
5 For example, only a selection from the first chapter of Ethical Studies is included in
a special 1911 issue of the Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nology on the topic of ‘Anglo-American Philosophies of Penal Law’ (see F.H. Bradley,
‘The Philosophy of Responsibility’, Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 2 (1911), pp. 186–98).
6 See H. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy,
Vol. I (Oxford, 1907), pp. 287– 91, previously published as H. Rashdall, ‘The Theory of
Punishment’, International Journal of Ethics, 2 (1) (1891). This was picked up by
Bradley who rejected Rashdall’s characterization of his theory of punishment, with a
subsequent rejoinder published by Rashdall. (See Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punish-
ment’, p. 284 n. and H. Rashdall, ‘Mr. Bradley on Punishment: An Explanation’, Inter-
national Journal of Ethics, 5 (1895), pp. 241–3.)
7 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, p. 287.
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Any infliction of pain, loss, or death is justified, it appears, for an adequate
social end’.8 Rashdall’s views on Bradley’s theory of punishment are highly
representative of how commentators on Bradley have universally understood
his theory of punishment. In this section I will begin by demonstrating why
commentators have found Bradley’s theory of punishment to be a retributivist
theory of punishment. My attention will focus only on his Ethical Studies.
The following section will consider the question of whether or not Bradley
offers a retributivist theory of punishment in Ethical Studies before consider-
ing whether or not Bradley changes his views on punishment.
At first glance it is easy to see why Bradley’s views on punishment in his
Ethical Studies were considered retributivist.9 For example, Bradley’s most
well known passage on punishment is often taken as a textbook definition of
retributivism. Bradley says:
Punishment is punishment, only when it is deserved. We pay the penalty,
because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if punishment is inflicted
for any other reason whatever than because it is merited by wrong, it is a
gross immorality, a crying injustice, an abominable crime, and not what it
pretends to be.10
This position is retributivist because it holds that we can only punish those
who are deserving of punishment. That is, we are forbidden from punishing
criminals on account of the fact that doing so may deter potential offenders or
bring about a greater common good. Instead, we punish the criminal because
he or she is morally responsible for an act of wrongdoing. Thus, a criminal
deserves punishment because he is responsible for wrongdoing. Our state per-
forms ‘an abominable crime’ if it inflicts punishment on someone who does
not deserve it.11 In fact, punishing the innocent should not be considered pun-
ishment, but a crime and ‘a gross immorality’.12
Bradley’s apparent retributivism is ‘negative’ then, rather than ‘positive’,
on the grounds that desert is necessary, but not sufficient, for punishment. We
may only punish the guilty, but need not always punish the guilty. That is, fac-
tors beyond punishable guilt may mitigate the severity of a criminal’s punish-
ment. Bradley says:
8 Ibid., p. 288 n. 1.
9 It is important to note that, in the relevant passages in Ethical Studies, Bradley’s pri-
mary focus is on responsibility and determinism rather than on offering a theory of
punishment, although he discusses punishment often in the opening chapter to Ethical
Studies. I am grateful to Bill Mander, Peter Nicholson and Bob Stern for highlighting the
importance of this matter for me.
10 Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 26–7.
11 Ibid., p. 27.
12 Ibid.
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Having once the right to punish, we may modify the punishment according
to the useful and the pleasant; but these are external to the matter, they can
not give us a right to punish, and nothing can do that but criminal desert.13
Therefore, we punish the guilty because they deserve punishment. However,
the amount of a criminal’s guilt need not be matched in value by the amount of
punishment. We may well punish in pursuit of a common good beyond what
might be strictly ‘deserved’ by an offender so long as the offender deserves to
be punished in the first place. The view of ‘negative’ retributivism presented
here (again, where desert is necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, for pun-
ishment) allows for the possibility that we need not punish the guilty if failing
to punish them aids our pursuit of ‘the useful and the pleasant’.14 Moreover,
this understanding of retributivism is opposed to ‘positive’ retributivism
which holds that a criminal’s desert is both a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion of punishment: we punish the guilty because they are guilty and without
exception.15
If this picture were an accurate depiction of Bradley’s theory of punish-
ment, then it is quite clear that his theory is retributivist. Indeed, virtually all
commentators universally cite Bradley as a defender of a retributivist theory
of punishment on precisely the picture presented here.16
III
The primary problem with this reading of Bradley’s theory of punishment in
Ethical Studies is that it mistakes his comments on punishment for a view of
punishment that he wants to defend. Instead, when Bradley discusses the view
of retributivism offered above he is presenting the views of others and not his
particular position on punishment.
For Bradley, those who endorse retributivism are characterized as ‘the vul-
gar’: an unenlightened person lacking in education and intellectual insight.17
In the passages cited above, Bradley argues that the view of ‘[p]unishment is
86 T. BROOKS
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Elsewhere I argue that ‘positive’ retributivism is no less problematic than ‘negative’
retributivism, although only the former is best understood as distinctively retributivist
(see T. Brooks, Punishment (London, 2011)). On ‘negative retributivism’, see
J.L. Mackie, ‘Morality and the Retributive Emotions’, Criminal Justice Ethics (1982),
pp. 3–10.
16 See Johnson, ‘Bradley and the Nature of Punishment’, pp. 104–5.
17 See Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 2–3. The Editor of a selection of Bradley’s Ethi-
cal Studies published in the Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and
Criminology comments: ‘ “Vulgar” in England means “ordinary” persons, not “coarse”
as in America.’ (See Bradley, ‘The Philosophy of Responsibility’, p. 186 n. 3; D.
Boucher and A. Vincent, British Idealism and Political Theory (Edinburgh, 2000), pp.
66, 85 n. 28; and P.P. Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists:
Selected Studies (Cambridge, 1990), p. 8.)
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punishment, only where it is deserved’ and the view that the reason why we
are punished is simply ‘because we owe it’ are the views of the vulgar, not the
views of enlightened philosophers.18 Thus Bradley does not endorse the view
that punishment need always be deserved and that we should punish criminals
simply because they deserve punishment. Thus commentators have misled
themselves in attributing retributivism to Bradley’s theory of punishment in
Ethical Studies.19
Bradley contrasts one perspective on punishment, namely, ‘the vulgar’,
with a second perspective which he attributes to the ‘Necessitarian’. The two
views are presented in order to demonstrate a contrast between them. Bradley
says:
For our vulgar . . . punishment is the complement of criminal desert; it is
justified only so far as deserved; and further is an end in itself. For our
Necessitarian, punishment is avowedly never an end in itself; it is never jus-
tifiable, except as a means to an external end.20
The vulgar defend a theory of punishment that holds that we punish the
deserving on account of a criminal deserving punishment. This position is
retributivist because it makes an intrinsic link between criminal responsibility
for wrongdoing and justified punishment. Against retributivism, the Neces-
sitarian — Bradley claims that John Stuart Mill is one example of a Necessi-
tarian — argues that punishment is justified not simply because punishment
might be deserved on account of criminal wrongdoing, but because punish-
ment might help to bring about some beneficial consequence. The Necessitarian
is, thus, a consequentialist who serves some particular view of legitimate ends
for the state.21
The first thing we should notice in Bradley’s discussion of the vulgar ver-
sus the Necessitarian is that he does not endorse the vulgar’s views on punish-
ment as presented. For example, Bradley approvingly cites a passage from
Mill:
If any one thinks that there is justice in the infliction of purposeless suffer-
ing; that there is a natural affinity between the two ideas of guilt and punish-
ment, which makes it intrinsically fitting that wherever there has been guilt,
pain should be inflicted by way of punishment . . . I acknowledge that I can
find no argument to justify punishment inflicted on this principle.22
18 See Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 26, 28.
19 This is not to say that Bradley’s theory of punishment is entirely anti-retributivist,
as I shall discuss in the following section.
20 Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 30.
21 This is not necessarily a correct view of Mill’s theory of punishment. My thanks to
Duncan Kelly for raising this point.
22 Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 30. The quotation is cited as J.S. Mill, An Examination
of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (London, 1865), p. 597.
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It is then clearly the case that Bradley does not endorse the view that punish-
ment is no more than a justified response to wrongdoing. Nor does Bradley
defend the view that we only punish the guilty because they are deserving.
Indeed, he says: ‘Justice does not = giving to each his just deserts’.23 If all
retributivists hold that we can only punish the deserving, then we have suffi-
ciently established that Bradley does not defend a retributivist theory of pun-
ishment in Ethical Studies. This fact is a major break from commentaries on
Bradley’s theory of punishment thus far.
This brings us to a second consideration with Bradley’s views on punish-
ment in Ethical Studies. This consideration is uncovering precisely what
Bradley’s views on punishment are. If Bradley is not a retributivist after all,
then what position does he hold, if any?
Bradley appears to want to defend a position somewhere between retributiv-
ism and Necessitarianism.24 He does not completely discard the link between
guilt and punishment in favour of punishing persons purely on account of the
consequentialist rewards that might be reaped by the state. Instead, his goal is
to leave a space for desert, but not to grant desert a primary position. Rather,
Bradley subordinates desert to societal maintenance.25
I will sketch Bradley’s position here with an eye towards developing it
further in the following section, where our attention will turn to his later
article on punishment. It is enough to note here that Bradley states in this later
article, published nearly two decades after Ethical Studies, that the ‘retribu-
tive view pure and simple will not work’.26 This view is consistent with his
position in Ethical Studies where Bradley rejects holding a retributivist theory
of punishment.
The main problem with retributivism, according to Bradley, is that we lack
the ability to ascertain the moral guilt and criminal responsibility for a crimi-
nal offender. In other words, if our task is to punish people because they are
‘deserving’ of punishment in some sense, then it is absolutely necessary for us
to determine whether or not another person is in possession of moral guilt for
an act of wrongdoing. We are unable to ascertain if a person deserves punish-
ment if we are unable to know if they possess moral guilt. This problem
becomes even greater for positive retributivists who argue that desert is a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for punishment, where punishment is not open
to consequentialist considerations. Their problem is not merely that they may
be unable to know another person’s moral guilt, but that they need to know
88 T. BROOKS
23 Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 211 n. 2, although see also F.H. Bradley, ‘Mr
Sidgwick’s Hedonism’, in Collected Essays, Vol. I (Oxford, 1935), p. 120 n. 1.
24 See Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 30–8.
25 The specific characterization of this position as a theory of punishment as societal
maintenance, rather than retributivist, preventative or rehabilitative, is offered by James
Seth (see J. Seth, A Study of Ethical Principles (Edinburgh, 9th edn., 1907), pp. 304–5).
26 Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, p. 274.
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both that (a) a criminal possesses moral guilt for his crime and (b) the amount
of moral guilt a criminal possesses for his crime. The first is necessary to
ensure the retributivist does not punish the innocent; the second is necessary
to ensure that the criminal’s punishment is proportional to his crime. The
problem of our inability to ascertain another’s moral guilt is a problem that
may fundamentally undermine all retributivist theories of punishment. Nor
has this fact been lost on some retributivists.27
Bradley believes we are unable to determine at least the amount of moral
guilt that another person possesses. Indeed, this is a view that he shares with
other fellow British Idealist writers.28 Bradley’s position is that ‘the principle
is good, but its application is seriously embarrassed’.29 That is, retributivism
as such fails as a practice. However, a more modified position that is more
sensitive to problems with its application might be more acceptable. For these
reasons, I do not take Bradley to say that we ought to punish whomever we
choose, but normally to select those that have performed a criminal act.
Indeed, there is no evidence to support the view that Bradley argues contrari-
wise despite his many criticisms of retributivism. Nevertheless, Bradley does
endorse the importance of desert for a defensible theory of punishment.
However, a final point worth noting is that Bradley priorities societal main-
tenance over desert. First, Bradley tells us that who we are is a product of our
place within a community: our identity is inextricably bound with the commu-
nity we belong to.30 Thus, Bradley says:
To know what a man is . . . you must not take him in isolation. He is one of a
people, he was born in a family, he lives in a certain society, in a certain
state. What he has to do depends on what his place is, what his function is,
and that all comes from his station in the organism.31
Who we are is a product of where we are. The state is crucial to our identities,
existing as ‘the real moral idea . . . stronger than the theories and the practice
of its members against it’ offering us ‘self-realization’ in return.32 Indeed, our
‘highest end and law’ is nothing less than ‘the welfare of the community’.33 It
27 See T. Brooks, ‘Kant’s Theory of Punishment’, Utilitas, 15 (2003), pp. 206–24.
28 For example, see R.G. Collingwood, Essays in Political Philosophy, ed. D. Boucher
(Oxford, 1995), p. 127; Mackenzie, A Manual of Ethics, p. 123; D.G. Ritchie, Philosophi-
cal Studies, ed. R. Latta (London, 1905), p. 343; and Seth, A Study of Ethical Principles,
p. 305.
29 See Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, p. 274.
30 See Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 166.
31 Ibid., p. 173. Later, Bradley argues (in ‘Ideal Morality’) that ‘[t]he content of the
good self’ has as its ‘first and most important contribution . . . from what we have called
my station and its duties’. ‘The basis and foundation of the ideal self is the self which is
true to my station and its duties.’ (See ibid., p. 220.)
32 Ibid., p. 201.
33 Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, p. 272.
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is clear that the community’s welfare contributes to my individual welfare: I
only possess welfare given my identity in my state.
Whilst there is no evidence in Ethical Studies that Bradley denies the view
that we should punish lawbreakers and not innocent people, it seems equally
clear that he seeks a middle position between the vulgar’s endorsement of
(negative) retributivism and the Necessitarian’s consequentialism.34 One way
they might be brought together is in the following manner. We might argue
that we punish in defence of societal maintenance. Our society is our highest
good and punishment should be in service of this good. However, the state
may only punish persons who have not broken the law in the most extreme
instances where the necessity of societal maintenance hangs in the balance.
Thus, we are not retributivists who hold that punishment must always be
meted to the deserving and we are also not Necessitarians who claim that pun-
ishment must only be concerned with bringing about the best consequences.
Instead, we claim that the primary purpose of punishment is to maintain our
community as a matter of priority, normally within the limits of punishing
those who break the law while being open to consequentialist considerations
when determining the specific punishment.
This picture of punishment is consistent with Bradley’s discussion of pun-
ishment in Ethical Studies. Bradley is not against normally taking a criminal’s
desert into account when considering whether or not to punish the criminal, so
long as desert is not the primary justification of punishment. Thus, while
retributivist desert may still play a role, Bradley largely rejects retributivism
in Ethical Studies, and this contrasts with virtually all interpretations of his
theory of punishment I am aware of.35
IV
There is a final issue we might consider. Nearly twenty years after Ethical
Studies, Bradley published an essay entitled ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’.
We might wonder whether or not Bradley endorses a retributivist theory in
this essay or, if he does not, whether or not he defends a more consequentialist-
friendly theory of punishment based on societal maintenance in this latter
essay that I have argued can also be found in his Ethical Studies.
The first thing we might note is that both commentators and Bradley dis-
agree on the relationship between his Ethical Studies and his later work. Thus,
while most commentators on Bradley’s views on punishment neglect his
90 T. BROOKS
34 In fact, not only is this position clearly defended by Bradley, it is what we might
expect from a Hegelian philosopher, although I do not have the space here to present this
view at greater length. (See T. Brooks, ‘The Unified Theory of Punishment’, in Punish-
ment (London, 2011).)
35 Perhaps another way of stating my claim is to say instead that Bradley’s theory of
punishment is not merely a retributivist theory of punishment, but much more than this
and non-retributivist elements play a major and regularly overlooked part.
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work beyond Ethical Studies, those that have not claim that Bradley’s views
on punishment change after Ethical Studies. More specifically, they argue
that Bradley moves from endorsing retributivism in Ethical Studies to ‘a pri-
marily utilitarian theory’ in his later essay, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’.36
Bradley himself insisted at least one year prior to the publication of ‘Some
Remarks on Punishment’ that his views had not changed since Ethical Studies
nor does he claim he offers a different theory of punishment in this later
work.37 Remarking on his treatment of punishment in Ethical Studies, Bradley
tells us that ‘I should have little to correct in the old statement of my view
except a certain number of one-sided and exaggerated expressions’.38 It is
clear that he denies offering any substantive changes, if offering any changes
at all.39
Thus, we have already noted that most commentators are incorrect to argue
that Bradley defends a retributivist theory of punishment in Ethical Studies.
We can now ask whether Bradley’s views change in his later work. My con-
tention is that his views do not change at all.
In his later essay, Bradley retains (a) his rejection of retributivism, (b) his
defence of societal maintenance, and (c) a view of punishment which holds
that punishing desert is secondary to preservation of the state. I will now dem-
onstrate each of these three points. If my reading is correct, then we can con-
firm that Bradley’s theory of punishment is not a retributivist theory of
punishment and Bradley is correct to argue that his views on punishment
remain consistent across his work. I will discuss each of the three issues above
in order to confirm the implications of my reading just stated.
In ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, Bradley continues to reject retributiv-
ism as he had previously. He says:
There is nothing, so far as I see, but superstition and prejudice. The idea that
justice is paramount, that, with the individual, gain or loss must correspond
to desert, and that, without this, the Universe has somehow broken down —
this popular idea is, after all, the merest prejudice. It seems to rest either on
36 This is discussed (and claimed it is an ‘over-simplified’ characterization) by John-
son, ‘Bradley and the Nature of Punishment’, pp. 103–4. Bernard Bosanquet argues that
Bradley’s theory of punishment is non-retributivist. (See Bernard Bosanquet, The Philo-
sophical Theory of the State (London, 4th edn., 1958 [1923]), p. 207.)
37 See F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London, 1893), p. 402 n.
38 Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, p. 284 n.
39 It might appear that I am making a logical flaw, attributing later ideas to an earlier
work. However, I would argue first that these later ideas are fully consistent with
Bradley’s earlier work. Second, Bradley himself argues that there is no inconsistency
between his earlier and later discussions. Therefore, I do not believe there is any such
flaw. My thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
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the assumption that there is no principle above justice, or on the common
error as to the absolute validity of principles.40
Bradley argues that punishment need not always be linked with moral guilt:
the fact that someone may be deserving of punishment is not itself a reason to
punish that person. Instead, we might choose to punish a person on different
grounds. Retributivists who argue for the necessity of desert for any legiti-
mate imposition of punishment are here said to defend a ‘superstition’ and
‘prejudice’, nothing more.
Bradley clearly defends a non-retributivist justification for legitimate pun-
ishment. For example, he says later in the essay:
I find . . . no difficulty in the increase or diminution of the penalty by con-
siderations other than those of desert. But, since the welfare of the state is
used in punishment as the criterion of desert, I would remark that such
increase or diminution may be less than is imagined.41
Bradley does not deny the fact that we might decide to employ desert in deter-
mining whether to punish a criminal, as well as determining how severely we
should punish a criminal. Instead, he simply rejects desert as an absolute
standard we must apply in each and every case of determining whether to pun-
ish and how much we should punish. Thus, he has no difficulty with using
standards other than desert, although this view does not entail that we never
employ desert as a standard.
Instead of retributivist desert, Bradley suggests that societal maintenance,
or ‘the welfare of the state’, serves as our primary end in punishing. Bradley is
even more explicit on this point than in his earlier work: ‘The moral suprem-
acy of the community, its unrestricted right to deal with its members, is the
sole basis on which rational punishment can rest.’42 Recall that earlier we saw
that, for Bradley, when we defend and uphold our community’s welfare we at
the same time promote and maintain the welfare of the community’s individu-
als. The primary justification of punishment is just as much about societal
maintenance in his later work as before. Punishment is not justified solely
because it is deserved or because of good consequences, as such; but, rather,
punishment is justified because it brings about the specifically good conse-
quence of societal maintenance.
In sum, we should always have an eye towards ‘the general good’ of our
community when we determine criminal sentences.43 Bradley’s views echo
92 T. BROOKS
40 Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, p. 277.
41 Ibid., p. 284 n.
42 Ibid., pp. 272–3. See P. Nicholson, ‘Bradley as a Political Philosopher’, in The
Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, ed. A. Manser and G. Stock (Oxford, 1984), pp. 125–7; and
Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists, p. 25.
43 See Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, p. 274.
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both Hobbes’s claim that the state is our ‘Mortall God’ on earth,44 as well as
Hegel’s claim of the state is ‘the march of God in the world’45 when Bradley
says:
The welfare of the community is the end and is the ultimate standard. And
over its members the right of the moral organism is absolute. Its duty and its
right is to dispose of these members as seems to it best. Its right and duty is,
in brief, to be a Providence to itself.46
The promotion of the welfare of the community contributes to the welfare of
individuals, but when the two come into conflict the welfare of the commu-
nity takes priority. Thus far, it is clear that Bradley continues to reject
retributivism and that he defends a theory of social maintenance.
The final issue we must discuss is whether Bradley continues to defend a
hybrid theory of punishment that states that punishment need not always be
deserved, but that desert may often be an important consideration even if it is
subordinate to the necessity of societal maintenance. Indeed, we find that
Bradley’s views on this subject remain the same in his later work. For one
thing, he notes the subordinate status of moral guilt. He says: ‘We have not,
indeed, given up the idea of retribution and desert, but we have made it sec-
ondary and subject to the chief end of the general welfare.’47 Thus, desert may
be a consideration for us although it is not necessarily always a consideration.
It is not an absolute condition for just punishment. In fact, punishment may
take many forms in the promotion of societal maintenance. Bradley notes:
‘The educational, the deterrent, and the retributive view may each retain, we
may rather presume, a certain value.’48 This view of punishment is remark-
ably similar to that of other British Idealists, demonstrating that Bradley’s
position is not an aberration amongst the British Idealist tradition.49
A final question on this last issue concerns the punishment of the innocent.
If desert is not a necessary condition of all justified punishment, then we
might worry that Bradley would justify the punishment of innocent people.
Bradley appears to confirm our worry. He says:
To remove the innocent is unjust, but it is not, perhaps, therefore in all cases
wrong. Their removal, on the contrary, will be right if the general welfare
44 See T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge, 1996), p. 120 (Chapter 17).
45 See G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A.W. Wood, trans.
H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991), §258 Addition.
46 Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, p. 278. See ibid., p. 279.
47 Ibid., p. 274.
48 Ibid., p. 272.
49 For example, see T. Brooks, ‘T.H. Green’s Theory of Punishment’, History of
Political Thought, 24 (2003), pp. 685–701; Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the
State, p. 216; Mackenzie, A Manual of Ethics, pp. 430–2; D.G. Ritchie, Studies in Politi-
cal and Social Ethics (London, 1902), p. 221; and J. Seth, ‘The Theory of Punishment’,
International Journal of Ethics, 2 (1892), p. 236.
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demands it . . . where the good of the whole may call for moral surgery,
mere innocence is certainly no exemption or safeguard.50
Bradley appears to distinguish what is moral best (i.e. the ‘just’) from what is
permissible (i.e. the ‘right’). It might be best if we never punish the innocent.
The principle that punishing the deserving remains a good ideal we should
aspire to fulfil. However, it is not an absolute condition for legitimate punish-
ment.51 If the welfare of the community in an extreme emergency demanded
punishment of undeserving persons, then Bradley’s theory of punishment
appears to justify the punishment of the innocent even if it acknowledges its
utmost reluctance to ever punish innocent people.
V
Bradley’s theory of punishment is universally held by virtually all commenta-
tors to be a retributivist theory of punishment. Some commentators argue this
is true at least in Ethical Studies, if not in his work as a whole. This article
strongly rejects this reading of Bradley.
I have demonstrated that Bradley does not defend a retributivist theory of
punishment. Instead, he argues in favour of societal maintenance, not desert,
as the primary justification of punishment within a two-tiered hybrid theory
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50 Bradley, ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’, p. 275. It may appear that when Bradley
is speaking of ‘removing’ innocent people he is not equating ‘removing’ with ‘punish-
ing’. In the sentence following the passage cited above, Bradley says: ‘We may doubt if
such cutting-off without crime can fairly be called punishment, but, the thing being justi-
fied, I will not pause to consider the name. It is better to ignore a question which does not
seem to affect our main result.’ (Ibid.) This further explanation makes it very clear that
Bradley endorses treating the innocent as if they were convicted criminals. He reminds
us that under very specific circumstances — namely, in order to maintain the common
good through ‘moral surgery’ — it is justifiable to subject the innocent to penal correc-
tion. Thus, I believe it is correct to claim that in this passage Bradley at least appears to
confirm that his theory justifies the punishment of the innocent. That said, it is equally
clear that Bradley literally ‘ignores’ the question of whether such treatment of the inno-
cent is not merely ‘removing’ but ‘punishment’. For this reason, my claim is only that he
appears to justify the punishment of the innocent, as it is slightly ambiguous whether ‘re-
moving’ is the same as ‘punishment’, strictly speaking. Unfortunately, Bradley does not
say more here on this position. My most sincere thanks to David Boucher, Peter Nichol-
son, Colin Tyler and, most especially, James Connolly and an anonymous referee for
pushing me on this issue.
51 I believe that David Crossley is correct to say that ‘the good of society comes
first . . . We hope that such conflicts may not arise, thereby allowing us to serve both soci-
ety’s good and each individual’s just treatment at all times’. However, I entirely reject his
interpretation of Bradley’s theory of punishment as a utilitarian theory of punishment.
Bradley’s aim is not to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, but societal maintenance
within a certain framework, which is a strikingly different project. (See D. Crossley,
‘Bradley’s Utilitarian Theory of Punishment’, Ethics, 86 (1976), pp. 200–13, esp.
p. 207.)
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where desert considerations are subordinate to the protection of the commu-
nity’s welfare. Where the demand to uphold societal maintenance conflicts
with desert, Bradley sides with the former over the latter and, in so doing,
accepts the legitimacy of punishing undeserving persons in emergency situa-
tions. Finally, it is equally clear that Bradley’s views on punishment remain
consistent between his Ethical Studies and his essay ‘Some Remarks on
Punishment’.
This article marks a fairly radical break from much of the work on Bradley’s
theory of punishment thus far. The question remains as to how commentators
have gone astray. My best explanation is that early commentators, writing not
long after Ethical Studies, incorrectly began propounding the view that
Bradley defended retributivism and that this view has since become the
received wisdom. In the absence of much work on Bradley’s theory of punishment
over the past few years, this conventional wisdom has gone unchallenged.
It is my hope then that this article offers a substantial contribution in over-
turning a misreading of Bradley that has been perpetuated unnoticed for too
long. I doubt that my interpretation of Bradley’s theory of punishment will
make it more appealing to modern commentators given its stance on desert
and the innocent. Nevertheless, beyond its greater textual accuracy, this
article should make it clear that Bradley’s theory of punishment is firmly in a
tradition of Hegelian philosophers writing in the nineteenth century in its
affirmation of societal maintenance as the primary justification of punish-
ment.52 Thus, the Bradley we find may be unfamiliar, but he is now far more
consistent with the views of fellow British Idealists writing at his time.53
Thom Brooks UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE
52 On Hegel’s theory of punishment, see T. Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A
Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right (Edinburgh, 2007), pp. 39–51.
53 This is in keeping with the view that ‘[t]he British Idealists all hold essentially the
same political philosophy’, even if they each maintained significant differences. (See
Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists, p. 4.)
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